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Thomas McMorrow* Not Ideas of the Thing but the Thing Itself:
Imagining a Support Group for Separated
and Divorced Fathers as a Site of Legal
Education
Legal education is not just about attaining an abstract knowledge of formal
institutions, norms, and processes; it is also about developing insight into oneself
and ones relationships. Therefore, understanding and developing the personal
and social conditions that make governance through law possible are crucial
elements of legal education. This article highlights legal education's potential
role in fostering every person's sense of implication in-and responsibility for-
building a just society In order to illustrate this concept, this article looks at
the ways in which DADs, a support group for separated and divorced fathers,
constitutes a site of legal education.
L'6ducationjuridique n'a pas pour unique objectif Iacquisition d'une connaissance
abstraite d'institutions, de normes et de processus formels; elle vise 6galement
I'acquisition d'une connaissance de soi et de ses relations. Par consequent, la
comprehension et le ddveloppement des conditions personnelles et sociales
qui rendent possible la gouvernance par le droit sont des elements essentiels
de I'lducation juridique. Dans cet article, I'auteur fait ressortir le rdle potentiel
de I'lducation juridique pour favoriser le sentiment d'implication personnelle
de chacun pour construire une socidtd juste et renforcer sa responsabilit6 a cet
6gard. Pour illustrer ce concept, il se penche sur les fagons dont DADS, groupe de
soutien pour peres sdpards et divorces, constitue un lieu de formation juridique.
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, University of Ontario Institute of Technology. This
is a revised version of a paper given at the legal education symposium at the Facult6 de droit de
l'Universit6 de Sherbrooke : << Des normes de l'6ducation a l'6ducation aux normes >> on 22 May
2015 in Sherbrooke, Quebec, and the Canadian Association of Law Teachers conference on 2 June
2015 in Ottawa, Ontario. I thank Sasha Baglay, Angela Campbell, Kate Glover, Nelcy Lopez, Michael
McMorrow, Natalie Oman, and this journal's two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments
on earlier iterations of this paper.
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Introduction
I. Setting sights on sites of legal education
II. Taking a look at a community-based support group for fathers in
transition




How one conceives law, education, and the relationship between them,
shapes the horizon of possibilities for legal education.' To imagine law and
education pluralistically is to see them as complex, shared, interactional
human endeavours, rather than externally-imposed, expert-technical
means of controlling social behaviour.2 The personal significance of these
inter-related, inherently social practices lies in their contribution to the
project of discovering what it means to be a human being. My aim in
this article is to advance the idea of legal education as an exercise in
personal growth and renewed social engagement. To this end, I present
Dads Aiming for Direction and Support (DADS)-a support group for
separated and divorced fathers-as a site of legal education.
I begin with an explanation of what I mean by a "site of legal
education." I then sketch some of the acute challenges that participants in
the DADS program are facing in their lives, as well as how the program
endeavours to help them. Next, I present a way of thinking about law as
a more holistic normative endeavour than it is usually framed. From this
1. Every account of what legal education "is" comports some idea of what legal education is "for";
the same holds true for law; see Kenneth J Winston, "The Ideal Element in a Definition of Law" (1986)
5 Law & Phil 89.
2. Lon L Fuller elaborates such a conception in The Morality of Law, 2nd ed (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1969) as well as other works cited in various references below. For an introduction
to how this way of framing law has been developed in the work of Roderick Macdonald, see Thomas
McMorrow, "Inspiring Governance Through Law: Rod Macdonald's Jurisprudence of Hope"
in Richard Janda, Daniel Jutras & Rosalie Jukier, eds, The Unbounded Level of the Mind: Rod
Macdonalds Legal Imagination (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015) 211. I
have explored some of the implications of this kind of legal theoretical approach for law teaching in
"Learning to Mediate through Teaching Mediation" (2015) 26 CLEAR 49.
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point of view, one has a clearer vantage point to see DADS as a site of
legal education. Thereby, I attempt to show that the program's potential
to foster opportunities for participants to develop a sense of order and
meaning in their lives reveals what is at the very heart of legal education.
My goal in this paper is not to make specific curricular recommen-
dations.3 Nor is it to show that all legal educational environments are
identical. Instead, I hope to demonstrate how adopting an inclusive,
aspirational view of legal education can shed light on the kinds of learning
relevant to facilitating more just forms of human interaction through law.
Presenting DADS as a site of legal education underscores the relationship
that the program, its participants, and their families bear to law. Moreover,
it is also a way of resisting reclusion of law and legal education to the
remit of a privileged few-recognizing law instead as a resource and
responsibility of all members of society.
I. Setting sights on sites of legal education
Through formal study of the law, one becomes conversant in the ways that
power purports to be legitimated.' One not only learns about what law
is and how it may (or may not) work, but also why law evolves (or not),
and how to change it or keep it as is. As much as the smooth functioning
of the legal system needs individuals who are experts in the formal law,
a flourishing society requires much more from its legal professionals, its
law, and the human beings whose conduct it purports to govern. I argue
in favour of conceiving both law and legal education pluralistically, to
highlight not only their formal and explicit instantiations, but their
informal and implicit dimensions as well.'
At first blush, it may seem unusual to identify the work of a support
group for fathers whose spousal relationships have broken down with
the activity of legal education. So prevalent is the assumption that the
3. While I believe that conceiving law and legal education beyond their formal, institutional
incarnations offers sound footing for forging new paths in law school teaching, such a discussion
is beyond the scope of this article. For studies on the significance of "affect" in the formation and
professional development of jurists and efforts to re-imagine law as a "healing profession," see Paul
Maharg & Caroline Maughan, Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the
Law (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011) and Marjorie Silver, The Affective Assistance of Counsel: Practicing
Law as a Healing Profession (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007).
4. See Roderick A Macdonald, "Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal
Pluralism" (1998) 15 Ariz J Int'l & Comp L 69 at 78.
5. See the typology of sites and modes of law-making that Roderick Macdonald outlines in the
following: "Pour la reconnaissance d'une normativit6 juridique implicite et 'infdrentielle"' (1986)
18:1 Sociologie et Socidtds 47; "Les Veilles Gardes : hypotheses sur l'6mergence des normes,
l'internormativit6 et le ddsordre a travers une typologie des institutions normatives" in Jean-Guy
Belley, Le droit soluble : contributions qudbicoises a l'tude de l'internormativite (Paris: LGDJ,
1996) 233.
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defining feature of legal education is the formal preparation of students
to become lawyers6 that it is easy to ignore or discount other examples
of it. Other forms include lecture series targeted at curious laypersons,
professional development programs offered to seasoned jurists, and
various other ways of empowering people through the dissemination of
knowledge. Moreover, there is a great deal of pressure today to collapse
legal education into professional preparation, and then that, in turn, into
technical training. Nevertheless, whether law schools claim to be in the
business of training legal professionals or contributing to the formation of
citizens, by virtue of deliberately doing one, they are (deliberately or not)
doing the other.' It is important to situate legal education in a social field as
wide as that inhabited by those whose interactions law purports to govern.8
My hypothesis is that what unites legal education in its diverse forms is
its potential to foster every human being's sense of implication in, and
responsibility for, contributing to the reconstruction of more just forms
of social ordering.9 This way legal education may be seen to embrace-
while at the same time transcend-the particular concerns that attend the
practice of law and inform the training of lawyers.10
Even though accounts differ over what preparation for the legal
profession ought to specifically entail, they nonetheless tend to equate
education solely with schooling, and law exclusively with the official legal
6. See Douglas D Ferguson, "The Great Disconnect: Reconnecting the Academy to the Profession"
(2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 819; Lee Stuesser, "The Future of Canadian Law Schools" (2013) 37:1 Man LJ
155; Harry T Edwards, "The Growing Disjunctionbetween Legal Education and the Legal Profession"
(1992) 91 Mich L Rev 34.
7. See David Sandomierski, "Training Lawyers, Cultivating Citizens, and Re-Enchanting the Legal
Professional" (2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 739.
8. The point parallels Roderick Macdonald's argument that one should not foreclose understandings
of "access to justice" by automatically conflating it withto "access to state law"; see "Access to Civil
Justice" in Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook ofEmpirical Legal Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 502.
9. I have drawn inspiration for this phrasing from Thomas Merton, Conjectures of a Guilty
Bystander (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1966) at 232. On forms of social ordering,
see Lon L Fuller, The Principles ofSocial Order: Selected Essays ofLon Fuller, revised ed by Kenneth
Winston (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001).
10. The equation of legal education with the training of lawyers has a long pedigree. It is what Chief
Justice Coke expressed in response to King James I's claim that, by virtue of being an educated person
equipped with powers of reason, he was as qualified to sit in judgement as any judge: "True it was
that, God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science and great endowments of nature; but His
Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes... are not to be decided by
natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law, which law is an art which requires
long study and experience, before that a man can attain to cognizance of it." Prohibitions del Roy,
(1607) 77 ER 1342, 1343 (KB), cited in Ernest Weinrib, "Can Law Survive Legal Education?" (2007)
60 Vand L Rev 401 at 437.
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normative outputs of the state." Even public legal education initiatives
and university programs targeted at a wider swathe of people than aspiring
lawyers tend to embody these assumptions.1 2
But as the old saw attributed to Mark Twain-that "I never let schooling
get in the way of my education"-implies, it is not just within the confines
of academic institutions that learning occurs. Indeed, the formative role
of apprenticeship for lawyers-not just in the past but also in the present,
and no doubt the future-testifies to the learning taking place beyond the
walls of the classroom.1 3 Practice makes the practitioner-of the law, or
anything else for that matter. Formal educational institutions may put up
a shingle, but there are many sites of education that are in the business of
teaching and learning, even though they do not explicitly profess to be.
It would be equally unrepresentative to recognize as law only that which
"thinks of itself as law."14 Nevertheless, many years ago, Lon L. Fuller
pointed out the strong appetite among jurists for the "intellectual flavour
of made law";" that is, the explicitly legal, institutionally sanctioned,
state-backed, and formally elaborated system of law. In support of a more
balanced diet, Fuller stressed the importance of recognizing the implicit,
customarily established, unofficially generated and informally expressed
11. Even professedly trenchant critiques of legal education presuppose its path and point of arrival
to be "law school and life as a lawyer," Duncan Kennedy, "Legal Education and the Reproduction of
Hierarchy" (1982) 32 J Leg Educ 591 at 612.
12. Consider, for example, how the primary focus of the public legal education initiative Law in
Action Within Schools (LAWS) is to expose "at-risk" secondary school students to "legal issues, the
justice system and the legal profession": Law in Action Within Schools, online: <www.lawinaction.
ca>. Performing mock trials is presented as an example of "law in action within schools" but the
facilitation of peer-to-peer mediation is not. Privileging "lawyers' law" and the activities of legal
practitioners is effectively what certain strident visions of university "law and society" programs do
as well; see Lesley Jacobs, "Legal Consciousness and the Promise of Law & Society" (2003) 18 CJLS
61. Such insistence on the incommensurable differences between "law school" and "legal studies"
gives the impression that one doth protest too much; on this point, see Vincent Kazmierski, "How
Much Law in Legal Studies? Approaches to Teaching 'Legal' Research and Doctrinal Analysis in a
Legal Studies Program" (2014) 29:3 CJLS 293.
13. For one to be "of' a profession before entering it, the study and the practice of law would have
to be replicas of each other. Even if one were to substitute a system of professional apprenticeship
for university-based study, it would still take time to learn the intricacies of the trade, not to mention
the finer points of the law. Law societies recognized that university-based study could offer a more
broadly-based, intellectually rigorous legal education to its future members than the apprenticeship
system ever could; for instance, see C Jan Kyer & Jerome E Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil
A Wright, the Benchers, and Legal Education in Ontario 1923-1957 (Toronto: Osgoode Society,
1987). What may seem like the particularly intense pressure today to make legal study more closely
approximate legal practice has in fact always existed; see "Section III: Professional Colonization" and
accompanying footnotes in Roderick Macdonald & Thomas McMorrow, "Decolonizing Law School"
(2014) 51:4 Alta L Rev 717.
14. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Towards a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in
Paradigmatic Transition (London: Routledge, 1995) at 429.
15. Lon L Fuller, Anatomy ofthe Law (Westport: Greenwood Press, [1968] 1976) at 57.
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dimensions of legal normativity.16 Notwithstanding the regular tendency
to oppose them to one another, Fuller argued that like "the two blades of a
pair of scissors," the patent and latent dimensions of law are two parts of a
whole, stating "[i]f we watch only one blade we may conclude it does all
the cutting... [but] both blades cut... neither can cut without the other.""
Just as formal legal study in an academic environment does not
represent the only possible mode of legal education," neither do the
activities of legal practitioners sum up the interactive, social practice that
is law.19 Both within and beyond the walls of law faculties, universities,
and bar courses exist as informal and implicit sites of legal education.
These spaces for human interaction are not explicitly consecrated to the
activity of formally studying the law, but nonetheless facilitate legal
education.2 0 The greater the extent to which teaching and learning aims
are expressly laid out and consciously pursued, the more formal the site of
education is. The more official, systematic, and deliberate the elaboration
of norms, the more explicit the site of law-making. For example, a law
school is a formal site of education, but an implicit site of law-making;
conversely, Parliament is an informal site of education but an explicit site
of law-making.
DADS is a "formal site of education," insofar as it has a curriculum, is
centred around explicit learning objectives and has facilitators performing
ateaching role. It is not a formal site of "legal education," however, because
its goal is neither to train lawyers nor to impart an abstract knowledge of
the legal system. Although the sessions are not designated for a sustained,
focused study of the rules, rationales, principles, institutions and processes
of family law, informal discussions of these topics frequently arise.
Moreover, to the extent that the participants are learning about themselves
and how to relate better to others, including their children and former
spouses, they are learning to actively contribute to the conditions for
16. Lon L Fuller, "Human Interaction and the Law" (1969) 14 Am J Juris 1 at 1.
17. Lon L Fuller, "American Legal Realism" (1934) 82:5 U Penn L Rev 429 at 452.
18. On clinical legal education and other forms of "experiential legal education," see Douglas D
Ferguson, "The State of Experiential Education in Canadian Law Schools" (2013) 37:1 Man LJ 465;
Lorne Sossin, "Experience the Future of Legal Education" 51:4 Alta L Rev 849.
19. Eugen Ehrlich evokes this idea with his metaphor of the "living law"; see Eugen Ehrlich,
"Foreword" inFundamental Principles ofthe Sociology ofLaw, translated by Walter Moll (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1936). See Roscoe Pound's "Introduction" to the 1936 English translation:
ibid at XXX. For interpretations of the contemporary salience of Ehrlich's work, see Marc Hertogh,
ed, Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).
20. The personally and professionally formative experiences law students have outside of the
classroom are also important. See Desmond Manderson and Sarah Turner's argument as to the student-
socialization functions ofa weekly networking event sponsoredby law firms at a Canadian law school:
"Coffee House: Habitus and Performance Among Law Students" (2006) 31:3 Law & Soc Inquiry 649.
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rule-based, other-regarding social interaction. This is part of both legal
education and of law-making.
II. Taking a look at a community-based support group for fathers in
transition
At the request of the John Howard Society (JHS) of Durham Region,
my colleague Shahid Alvi and I undertook an evaluation of their DADS
program.2 1 We conducted our intensive study of the program on an
understanding with the JHS that we would be free to use the data we
collected for scholarly purposes-subject, of course, to the informed
consent of participants and certain confidentiality safeguards.2 2 As
part of our research, we reviewed past and present program materials,
administered an intake and post-exit survey, and carried out interviews
(with five of the six participants, one past participant, the two facilitators,
and four former facilitators). We also carried out unobtrusive observations
of the ten weekly two-hour meetings of the Fall 2014 session. Each week
we sat at a small table in the corner of the room writing our observations
down in our notebooks.
The JHS of Durham Region established the DADS program in 1995
in response to clients seeking a peer support group to help them cope with
the dissolution of their spousal relationships and, in particular, the impact
on their relationships with their children. 23 Although there have been
modifications to the program over the years, its design and delivery have
been relatively consistent. Two JHS employees-with experience and
training in the fields of counselling and social work-facilitate the sessions.
Since the program's inception, at least one of the facilitators has been a
woman. Structured around a ten-chapter program manual, the sessions
include information, tips, exercises, and discussions on the following
topics: the nature and purpose of the program, the impact separation and
divorce can have on children, and the ways in which, depending on their
age, children may respond to these experiences. The subject of how to
have a "business relationship" and minimize conflict with one's co-parent
is also discussed, and strategies for coping with anger, stress, grief, and
21. Thomas McMorrow & Shahid Alvi, DADS Program Evaluation Report (6 April 2015) (on file
with author).
22. We carried out the research with the UOIT Research Ethics Board's approval and in accordance
with the Tri-council Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans.
23. DadsAimingfor Direction and Support Participant Manual 2014 at (on file with the author). For
an analysis of the program in relation to the concept of social capital, see Thomas McMorrow & Shahid
Alvi, "Better Dads? Better Men? The Role of a Community Based Support Program" (Paper delivered
at the Canadian Law and Society Association Conference, Ottawa, 4 June 2015) [unpublished].
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self-esteem are also addressed. The program concluded with a re-cap of
the larger themes.
The group of men who participate in DADS is diverse-displaying
a range of demographic characteristics. Their educational backgrounds,
income levels, professional occupations, and employment statuses range
widely. How they come to participate in the program also differs, as do
their motivations for participating. Some participants ostensibly join
DADS just to get the certificate at the end, believing that it will help
them in their legal matters, such as child custody disputes. For others,
the primary motivation appears to be their perception of the therapeutic
benefits the program will have.
Participants are going through a tumultuous period in their lives,
characterized by high levels of conflict and stress.24 While dealing
with feelings of anger, frustration, grief and anxiety, many may also be
engaging in a range of harmful and avoidant behaviours. Regardless, they
are endeavouring to cope with the changes associated with irremediable
spousal relationship break-down. Based on what the men said in the
sessions and interviews, two central themes emerge. First, the participants
feel as if they have no recourse, especially in response to the misconduct
of their former spouses but also in respect to the deterioration of their
relationships with their children. They frequently describe the conflicts
they have with their former spouses as both intractable and damaging for
their children. They express holding out little hope in lawyers, the courts
or anyone else to improve their situations.
Another prominent theme is the participants' sense of instability.
The men referred to the financial toll. The economic costs of the divorce
process, spiked by the high price of legal fees, were felt all the more acutely
in cases where the individual was unemployed. Dollars and cents were far
from the primary preoccupation of the participants, though. Characteristic
of the circumstances that led all of the participants to the program was their
experience of emotional, social and normative instability. In some cases
the sense of emotional instability was described by the participants as
psychological in character. For example, in the interviews one participant
disclosed his struggle with situational depression, while another explained
he was in DADS because he could not afford a psychologist. The program
is designed to encourage participants to acknowledge their feelings, to
understand why they feel the way they do, and to develop strategies for
dealing with their feelings.
24. Kathryn Bonach, "Factors Contributing to Quality Coparenting: Implications for Family Policy"
(2005) 43:3-4 J Divorce & Remarriage 79.
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One's social life often undergoes significant changes during the
divorce process. Not only can there be a profound change in the nature of
the relationship one has with one's spouse, but also with one's children,
extended family, friends, and the wider community. It is a marked period
of transition for oneself and for the most important people in one's life.2 5
Changes to relationships both prompt and proceed from shifts in personal
commitments. In this context, what one's social roles are and how one
should go about fulfilling them become live questions (whether or not one
consciously considers them). This is what I mean by normative instability:
the order in one's life is undergoing transformation. How do the old
rules-or any rules-apply now?
The potential reasons and remedies for feelings of instability and
lack of recourse have multiple dimensions: intellectual and emotional,
educational and normative, psychological and institutional, economic and
social. The DADS program has a limited capacity to provide concrete
redress for its participants. For this reason, one experienced social worker
described facilitating DADS as "the hardest thing" she had ever done. In
our interview, she stated:
I work with high-risk teenage boys and it's a heck of a lot easier to work
with the... . because I can teach them and train them and work with
them, but DADS I can't fix their problem. I can't give their kids back...
In just about every area of social service work that I've done I've been
able to offer a solution somehow. I don't have one for that. There's no
solution, right?26
Even though an incentive for many participants is the chance that
joining the program will enhance their prospects of success in their attempts
to gain custody or have access to their children, the program's real value
lies not in its ability to increase the quantity of contact participants have
with their children, but in its potential to help them improve the quality
of that contact. All the participants attested to finding the readings in the
course manual helpful. Indeed, one noted that he shared the course manual
with his parents to help them see the importance of not discussing his
co-parent's failings around the children and to develop coping strategies
themselves. The readings, exercises and discussions offer occasion for
25. See Leesa A McBroom, "Understanding postdivorce coparenting families: Integrative literature
review" (2011)23:7 JAmericanAcademy Nurse Practitioners 382; TylerB Jamisonetal, "Transitioning
to Postdivorce Family Life: A Grounded Theory Investigation of Resilience in Coparenting" (2014)
63:3 Family Relations 411.
26. Interview of facilitator 6 (18 December 2014).
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critical self-reflection on what it means to be a good father and a good
person.27
The support group context contributes to both the therapeutic and
educational roles ofthe program. Through their interactions, the participants
provide validation and offer guidance to each other. Their exchanges are
occasions for affirmation and correction. Being listened to is instrumental
to talking through one's challenges. Conversely, listening to others enables
one to see one's own difficulties and one's ways of approaching them in a
new light. Nearly all of the men in the set of sessions we studied expressly
acknowledged that one of the chief benefits of attending the program was,
in the words of one participant, to "hear about other peoples' experiences...
[which] helps to put perspective on things."2 8 Thus, the support group
provides an opportunity to feel supported and encouraged by individuals
facing similar challenges. It gives participants a chance to draw hope from
the stories they hear. Finally, it gives the men an opportunity to discuss
problems they are facing, to articulate the difficulties they are encountering
with a sympathetic group of people, and to work out ways of responding
constructively to these challenges.
III. Reflecting on the roles ofDADS and dads in the construction of
family law
What does this educational and therapeutic program have to do with law?
Notwithstanding its recognition that children have the right to meaningful
relationships with both of their parents,2 9 DADS does not profess to
be a "fathers' rights group";3 0 in fact, it expressly distances itself from
27. For an analysis of the various ways in which notions of fatherhood are constructed through law
and social practices, see Richard Collier & Sally Shelton, Fragmenting Fatherhood: A Socio-legal
Study (Oxford; Portland: Hart Pub, 2008).
28. Interview of participant 1 (13 November 2014).
29. On whether and how such a principle should be translated into official state law, see Nicholas
Bala, "Bringing Canada's Divorce Act into the New Millennium: Enacting a Child-Focused Parenting
Law" (2015) 40:2 Queen's LJ 425; Edward Kruk, The Equal Parent Presumption (Montreal;
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2013); Susan B Boyd, "Autonomy for Mothers?
Relational Theory and Parenting Apart" (2010) 18:2 Fem Leg Studies 127; Susan B Boyd, Custody,
Law, and Women s Work (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003); Paul Millar, The Best Interests of
Children: An Evidence-Based Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Noel Semple,
"Book Review: The Best Interests of Children-AnEvidence Based Approach, by Paul Millar" (2011)
48:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 695; Janet R Johnston, "Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse
Visitation: Recent Research and Social Policy Implications for the Alienated Child" (2005) 38:4 Fam
LQ 757.
30. See Molly Dragiewicz, Equality with a vengeance: Men s rights groups, battered women, and
antifeminist backlash (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2011); Richard Collier& Sally Sheldon,
eds, Fathers'RightsActivism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Oxford and Portland: Hart
Publishing, 2006); in particular, see the insightful analysis of the "micro politics of child contact," in
Carol Smart's preface to the Collier and Sheldon book.
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these types of "pro men" organizations.3 1 The aims of the program are
educational and therapeutic; its goals encompass neither legal advocacy
nor law reform.3 2 In the sessions, participant grumblings about "a system
rigged in favour of women" were re-directed towards discussion of the
steps that participants can take to deal constructively with their co-parents,
to develop positive relationships with their kids, and to better attend to
their own self-care. This was done by the lead facilitator, who sensitively
and thoughtfully drew from her own personal experience as a woman
who went through a difficult divorce. She was clearly respected by the
participants and her experience of having facilitated many sessions in the
past was evident.
There is an explicit connection between this program and the family
law system. Many of the participants are advised to attend the program by
lawyers representing them in disputes before the courts. In this respect,
participants regularly exchange advice on navigating the family law
system, share opinions about its nature, and discuss their experiences with
"the system," "the law," "the courts" and "lawyers." On an implicit level
lies an even more significant link. Because the program aims to assist
participants to grow as "dads," the men are continuously discussing and
reflecting on their experiences, emotions, rights, duties, obligations and
aspirations as fathers and co-parents. In this way, the program provides
a space in which participants share, contest, explore and develop their
concepts of and feelings about the norms governing their post-dissolution
family lives.
How individuals themselves imagine, invent and interpret the norms
by which they govern their interactions is as important to understanding
law as the rules, institutions and processes whereby authorities purport to
prescribe human conduct.3 3 When it comes to the creative role that people
play in constructing legal normativity, many accounts of family law either
deny its existence, bracket its relevance or diminish its significance.3 4
In emphasizing official, state-based sites of law-making, such as courts
31. Susan B Boyd & Claire Young, "Who Influences Family Law Reform? Discourses on Motherhood
and Fatherhood in Legislative Reform Debates in Canada" (2002) 26 Studies in L, Politics, & Society
43.
32. Programs of this nature are rare in Canada although there are a number of them in the United
States; see Jacinta Bronte-Tinkew et al, "Elements of Promising Practice for Fatherhood Programs:
Evidence-Based Research Findings on Programs for Fathers" Report prepared for the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance
(Washington, DC: Child Trends, 2007).
33. Roderick A Macdonald & David Sandomierski, "Against Nomopolies" (2007) 57:4 N Ir Leg Q
610.
34. Martha Marie Kleinhans & Roderick AMacdonald, "What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?" (1997)
12 CJLS 25 at 28-29.
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and legislatures, they elect to ignore the question of what people
actually do or they try to portray the role of people as either separate
from or secondary to the project of law.35 Symbolizing commercial
exchange or public administration under the governance of rules has
an intuitive resonance that framing family living in this way usually
does not.36 The necessity of formal rules grows pronouncedly in the
post-dissolution context since parties can no longer rely on either the
formal expectations or tacit understandings underlying their spousal
relationship. The challenge of defining new kinds of rules, roles and,
ultimately, relationships may very well require the invocation of explicit
and formal legal norms, institutions, methodologies, justifications, and
processes. But these formal processes do not provide a substitute for
the negotiation and development of informal, implicit, and inferential
normativity.37
At its best, the program does not just permit participants to sound
off about the system, but to challenge their preconceptions. A past
participant who was invited to speak with the group in the final session
discussed how his perspective had changed through his participation
in the program:
So one thing I learned and I still practice is don't involve the kids in
adult conflict. And I still will not talk about any of these issues with
him around. Whereas I know my ex as soon as she gets an audience
she'll tell everybody how bad I am in front of our son or whoever's
listening. And that's one thing, that was one of the most important
things I think I got from DADS is you've got to leave the kids out
of it.38
Extensive social-psychological literature has emerged on why people
accept the formal outcomes of institutionalized legal decision-making
35. Identifying a formal criterion-that is, establishing a positivist definition-is instrumental
to delimiting the field of family law. Such an approach has its justifications, see John Eekelaar,
"Evaluating Legal Regulation of Family Behaviour" (2010) 1 Int'l J Jurisprudence Fam 17 and
"Positivism and Plural Legal Systems" (2012) 25 Ratio Juris 513. For an illustration of some of
its limitations, see Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows" (1985) Wis L
Rev 819. Subscribing to a positivist definition of family law reinforces its differentiation (and
therefore legitimation) as a standalone field of legal practice and scholarship; see Emily Sack,
"The Burial of Family Law" (2008) 61 SMU L Rev 459.
36. Lon L Fuller notes that "the internal affairs of the marriage have generally been thought
to be inappropriate material for regulation by a regime of formal act-oriented rules, whether
imposed by law or by contract," observing "no laws in the books prescribing which spouse is
responsible for helping the children with their school work or allocating between husband and
wife the right to invite their respective relatives to make weekend visits," in "Mediation-Its
Forms and Functions" (1971) 44 S Cal L Rev 305 at 330.
37. See Macdonald, supra note 5.
38. DADS session# 10 (25 November 2014).
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processes as legitimate, even when they do not agree.3 9 Perhaps to seek
social arrangements that accord with one's sense of justice is to have to
swallow some element of injustice. One must not confuse law's aspiration
for justice with achievement of justice. At best, "the legal" only ever
offers an approximation of "the just." The past participant's remarks are
therefore evidence of weighing values and reconciling to oneself what is
worth fighting for and how.
When the same individual who had expressed in other sessions how
unfair he considered child support to be returned to this point, the past
participant offered an alternative perspective. Here I quote from that
exchange:
Present participant: "[You split the time with your child] 50/50 so why
do you have to pay child support?"
Past participant: "Well, gotta support the child [so he's] clothed, looked
after."
Present participant: "That's bullshit. Couldn't she get a job?"
Past participant: "Bottom line: someone has to pay to look after the
kids.""o
This dialogue is illustrative of participants challenging each other's views
of state legal principles and practices. Although most references made by
the men to the law and legal system were anecdotal and impressionistic in
character, the veteran female facilitator did provide tips from time to time.
Familiar with the kinds of fights that can crop up between former spouses,
she underscored the importance of including things like arrangements
for holidays-"everyone forgets about Halloween"-and provisions for
the emergency contact-"so dad has first right of refusal"-in orders and
agreements pertaining to child custody and access." Speaking to this group
of men in high conflict situations with their former spouses, she stressed
"everything has to be written, has to be stamped by the judge-otherwise
it won't happen."4 2 Notwithstanding these occasional comments, there
was no systematic effort to offer information about the legal system or to
provide resources to assist participants in understanding and navigating
the court process or alternative forms of dispute resolution.
39. Much of this has been influenced by the pioneering work of Tom Tyler in Why People Obey the
Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
40. DADS session # 10, supra note 38.
41. DADS session# 5 (23 October 2014).
42. Ibid.
340 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Both current and former facilitators ofthe program identified participant
success with progress made in learning to accept the things they cannot
change, while regaining a sense of control over their lives and hope for
their future. This involves discovering how to come to terms with what has
happened in one's life, reflecting on the ways in which one has contributed
to one's own situation, identifying one's goals, aspirations and values (as
parents and as persons), and working toward building healthy, rewarding
lives in relationship with one's children, one's co-parent, oneself and any
future romantic partners. To this end, the DADS program seeks to provide
participants with both support and tools. By no means does it remedy the
sense of disempowerment or disorder they may be experiencing, but it
does provide them with resources for their ongoing journey.
Cultivating the emotional, psychological and intellectual resources
people need to exercise agency is of primordial significance to law as
a normative undertaking. The very possibility of law as a rule-based
endeavour depends on human beings acting as responsible, creative and
normative actors. People need to be willing and able to orient their actions
according to what they feel are legitimate norms for family law to fulfill
its promise. John Dewar argues that when it comes to addressing family
conflict, "a realm in which big ideas are in play, where the passions are
engaged and in which the stakes are high for us all" law's virtue is that "it
calls us back to the level of practicality or functionality-the question, in
other words, of what will work."4 3 A legal arrangement's workability may
turn on factors such as the modesty of its ambitions or the genius of its
design; whether it actually works is another matter.
43. John Dewar, "Family Law and Its Discontents" (2000) 14 Int'l JL Pol & Fam 59 at 79-80.
Dewar draws on Cass Sunstein's argument that the aim of adjudication should be understood as that
of furnishing "incompletely theorized agreements"; that is, decisional outcomes framed in such a
general manner that people with differing perspectives, values and goals can accept them without
relinquishing their own deeply held normative commitments: Cass R Sunstein, "Incompletely
Theorized Agreements" (1995) 108 Harv L Rev 1733. Further illumination of the concept is offered
by Benjamin Berger's analysis of the place of law in the politics of religious freedom: Benjamin L
Berger, "The Virtues of Law in the Politics of Religious Freedom" (2014) 29:3 JL & Religion 1.
There is a danger, though, as identified by Jeremy Webber, of overstating the extent to which the
"incompletely theorized arguments" represented by court decisions can be developed at a remove
from deeper normative conflicts informing them. The adjudicative process of effecting a practical
compromise can never completely skirt over underlying arguments ofjustification. Moreover, argues
Webber, it is wrong to give their "incompletely theorized" character all the credit for the willingness
of disputing factions to accept them: "[M]embers realize that, within broad limits, they have to put up
with normative positions, normative interpretations, that they do not fully agree with ifthey are to live
in society with people who have their own minds... Legitimacy is a relative concept, in which there
canbe greater or lesser degrees of acceptance. It is not on-off, either accorded or not": "The Grammar
of Customary Law" (2009) 54 McGill U 579 at 624.
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Judicial decisions based on statute provide a set of formal norms and
procedures for the dissolution of spousal relations and the establishment
of parenting arrangements. Alison Diduck observes, "whether it is about
money, care of children, employment, income support, or housing, the
purpose of family law is to allocate and enforce responsibility for those
responsibilities."44 This purpose is not self-executing, however. People
need to be willing and able to act responsibly in order for state law to
discharge its function of allocating and enforcing accountability for these
roles.
People's faith in their capacity to fulfill their duties is as important
as any declaration of what those duties are. For a person who senses that
one's family relationships constitute such an unworkable mess that nothing
one does will make any meaningful difference, the law ceases to matter.
Lon L. Fuller argues that there are some situations in which "law fails of
its full mission.. .because it projects itself upon a social terrain incapable
of supporting it."4 ' Fuller describes these as instances "where the stream
of life simply does not offer a sufficient substance to keep afloat even the
most modest demands of the law." 46 To illustrate his point, he draws an
"analogy from family life," casting the father "in the role of law and son
in the role of citizen subject to law."4 ' The father is unable to exercise any
authority whatsoever if he and the son do not communicate at all: "son is
not stifled or oppressed by father's rules, he simply shrugs them off; they
do not enter meaningfully into his life at all, either as impediments or as
guides to conduct."4 ' Law proves ineffective if it fails to resonate. It is not
a matter of law's whistle being too loud and shrill to elicit its intended
response, but of being pitched at such a frequency that it fails to register
at all.
Roderick Macdonald notes: "in limiting the way in which people
are authorized to talk to each other about their conflicts, rules transform
44. AlisonDiduck, "What is Family Law For?" (2011) 64 Current Leg Probs 287 at 292.
45. Lon L Fuller, "The Law's Precarious Hold on Life" (1968-1969) 3 Ga L Rev 530 at 536. Fuller
marshals three examples from US law to support his argument that certain social conditions must
be satisfied for law to work (at 531-537): first, the problem of enforcing property rights on skid row
where no one is ever quite sure who owns what or where it came from. Second, that of enforcing a
contract in which the parties have not spelled out what they are agreeing to and have actually agreed
to different things. Third, that of applying the principle of fault-based liability when it is impossible
to tell based on ordinary powers of human observation and judgment what exactly happened and who
was to blame. In each case, the premises necessary for the respective laws of property, contract, and
tort to govern are absent
46. Ibid at 530.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
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claims of justification into arguments about the meaning of words."49
Sometimes, though, the language of law is merely appropriated as a
proxy for the "inarticulate complaints, open-ended differences of opinion,
or multidimensional conflicts" that persist in strongly felt ways.0 The
"non-interpretive arguments," as Macdonald calls them (i.e. the yearning
for vindication, vengeance or simple recognition), are, superficially,
"reformulated into a language and form consistent with that given by the
formal rule"; " below the surface, the purposes informing the rule may lie
unappreciated or adamantly opposed.52
The goal of the DADS program is to help fathers work through
personal struggles and establish healthier, more constructive relationships
with their children and former spouses. Learning how to act constructively
and responsibly has intellectual and emotional components. Just as
severe emotional instability may impede one from reaching the levels of
openness and concentration necessary for learning, a lack of awareness
or understanding will hamper one's discovery of what one can do to
enhance one's psychological well-being. If the modifier "educational"
denotes the discovery of knowledge and the development of specific
skills, competencies and habits, the term "therapeutic" evokes the process
of personal healing and the cultivation of emotional and psychological
well-being. The therapeutic and educational dimensions of the program
both complement and reinforce each other. In many ways, all education
has a therapeutic aspect and all therapy has an educational dimension.
While DADS serves educational and therapeutic roles, these in turn have
normative implications.53
Normativity finds expression in declarations of what people should
do, such as legislative enactments and judicial decisions; however, it is
also communicated implicitly through human interaction. Norms arise
from, and are reflected in, the manner in which individuals act toward
49. Roderick A Macdonald, "Custom Made: An Argument for a Non-Chirographic Critical Legal
Pluralism" (2011) 26:2 CJLS 301 at 324.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. See Harvey Brownstone, Tug of War: a Judge & Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the
Bitter Realities ofFamily Court (Toronto: ECW Press, 2009).
53. Indeed, the approach known as "therapeutic jurisprudence" examines how law itself may be
viewed through a therapeutic lens; see Shelley Kierstead, "Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Child
Protection" (2012) 17:1 Barry L Rev 31; Nathalie Des Rosiers, "Rights Are Not Enough: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Lessons for Law Reformers" (2002) 18 Touro L Rev 443.
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one another. 4 Indeed, how human beings actually treat each other can
be a much closer indicator of what they consider their obligations to be.
Participation in the DADS program nurtures each man's willingness and
ability to work with their former spouses and their children to cultivate
shared sign-posts for guiding their interactions. During this process,
family law comes to mean more than the coercive exercise of state power.
Recognizing both its formal and informal aspects, its explicit and implicit
dimensions, family law, as a normative endeavour, turns on the capacity of
its purported subjects to make it their own.
A recurring challenge acutely experienced by participants in DADS
is that for a wide variety of reasons, neither their former spouses nor their
children may wish to establish the level of communication requisite to
building the kind of normative regime they desire. These individuals must
contend not just with their own limitations, but also the limitations of the
people upon whom such a cooperative undertaking of law-making relies.
Success in court, even securing enforcement ofjudicial orders, will not by
itself ameliorate these conditions.
Thus, the conclusion that legal education "is inevitably concerned
with the activity of 'judges, legislators, and practitioners"' 5 5 would be
sound, if that were all there were to law. Boiling law-and therefore
legal education-down to a preoccupation with "the practice of law"
is not the product of logical necessity but an interpretive choice. Ernest
Weinrib argues that quite apart from making legal education recognizable
to the legal profession, exclusively equating law with the work of legal
professionals grants the subject the "generically determinate character"
it requires to serve as the object of intellectual study.5 6 Were the object of
university legal education not "the study of the practice of law," Weinrib
insists it would then be akin "to the zoological study of unicorns."
Electing not to centre teaching and learning strictly around a genenic
account of law need not be considered some flight of intellectual fancy. On
the contrary, it can stem from a well-justified skepticism toward the claim
that it is only those activities consciously governed by law that ought to
54. Fuller distinguishes between "enacted" or "made" law, on one hand, and "customary" law, on
the other, on the basis that the latter derives its force due not to the mere fact of its formal enactment
but "to the fact that it has found direct expression in the conduct of men [sic] toward one another"; see
Fuller, supra note 16 at 1.
55. See Weinrib, supra note 10 at 404.
56. Ibid at 401.
57. Ibid at 404.
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serve as the object of legal study.8 While endowment with the powers
of practical reasoning does not itself a legal expert make, neither does
knowledge of the "artificial reason and judgment of the law"5 9 capture the
full breadth and depth of what legal education involves. Absent a wider
and deeper knowledge of the human purposes it is intended to serve,
merely knowing the law offers an insufficient basis for understanding it.
Attending to certain dimensions of legal normativity-including the very
conditions of its possibility- is integral to legal education. It is vital for
those striving to be educated in the law so they might appreciate the forms
and limits of state law as a normative endeavour. Fundamentally, though,
paying attention to the conditions for law is part and parcel of engaging
in a critically self-reflective examination of how human beings endeavour
to order their lives together. Recognizing the unofficial, informal, and
implicit dimensions of any official, formal, explicit aspect of law reveals
the need to situate legal education within the wider social field in which
law is imagined, experienced, made and resisted.
Conclusion
Law as a normative endeavour relies on the commitment of its subjects.
How they choose to articulate and to live their commitments depends
on their mental and emotional well-being. When one is cultivating one's
capacity to build new normative regimes with their children and co-parents,
one is developing one's legal agency. Far from any law faculty, university,
bar course, or CEGEP, the program serves as a site of legal education
58. Legal pluralist scholarship robustly confronts this claim. For a conspectus of legal pluralist
approaches, see Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal
Pluralism (London: Ashgate, 2009). Objection to this plural account of law may be boiled down
to two rhetorical questions: first, if law is everywhere, does that mean law is nowhere? Second, if
everything is law, then does that imply law is everything? See Simon Roberts, "After Government-
On Representing Law Without the State" 68 (2005) Mod L Rev l and "Against Legal Pluralism: Some
Reflections on the Contemporary Enlargement of the Legal Domain" (1998) 42 J Leg Pluralism &
Unofficial L 95. It may be countered that the objection indicates a failure to appreciate the point critical
legal pluralists attempt to make; namely, that law is not a thing, but an activity. Law, Roderick A
Macdonald argues, is a manner of framing human conduct, a lens for analyzing social interaction. Like
religion or economics, sociology or ethics, law presents a field ofview that can be applied anywhere.
This does not mean, however, that law is always the only, let alone the best, way of understanding
the world; see Roderick A Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law (Montreal & Kingston: McGill
Queen's University Press, 2002). As Brian Tamanaha notes, legal pluralists have never been able to
dispose of this question to everyone's satisfaction: "Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present,
Local to Global" (2008) 30 Sydney L Rev 375. For Tamanaha's own foray into the matter, see "A
Non-Essentialist Concept of Legal Pluralism" (2000) 27 JL & Soc'y 296. For Macdonald's, see
"Triangulating Social Law Reform" in Ysolde Gendreau, ed, Dessiner la societe par le droit: Mapping
Society Through Law (Montreal: Les Editions Themis Inc, 2004) 120.
59. Prohibitions del Roy, supra note 10.
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because participants are learning how to "do" law; they are cultivating
their capacity to act as jurisgenerative human agents.6 0
Formal legal study enables one to develop a certain normative
literacy, permitting one to become more fluent in the language through
which political, economic, and social power purport to be legitimated.6 1 It
enables one to move beyond "the first year's tendency to flip flop between
formalism and mere equitable intuition."6 2 Acquiring such a facility does
not just enhance one's ability to understand the law, but also to change it.
Participants in DADS are not undertaking a formal study of the legal
system, its norms, institutions or processes, although this does take place
indirectly. They are, however, learning about themselves, while finding
new ways to govern their interactions with the most significant people
in their lives. They are discovering ways to articulate their thoughts and
feelings in modes other than self-pity and complaint. They are learning
to identify and pursue their aspirations, rather than just indulging in
lamentations over the past or fantasizing about the future. Although the
context of DADS is distinctive in many respects, every student of law, just
like every participant in DADS, confronts the challenge of establishing the
kind of order that will permit them to find a sense of meaning in their lives.
The American poet, Robert Frost, once said:
Any psychiatrist will tell you that making a basket, or making a horseshoe,
or giving anything form gives you a confidence in the universe... that it
has a forn, see. When you talk about your troubles and go to somebody
about them, you're just a fool. The best way to settle them is to make
something that has form, because all you want to do is get a sense of
form.6 3
While his reductive diagnosis of a person's troubles to a loss of a "sense
of form" may obscure the complexity of factors-psychological, social,
political, economic, and cultural-informing personal distress, there is
wisdom in Frost's remarks. I am not specifically referring to his folksy
paean to self-reliance-although I do think that writing a self-help book
is probably a more therapeutic exercise than reading one. When he says
60. Robert Cover uses "jurisgenerative" to describe the capacity of social movements, cultural
communities and judges to produce law: "Nomos and Narrative" (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4. Roderick A
Macdonald & David Sandomierski attribute this law-making potential to all legal subjects, since it is
ultimately they who decide what norms to treat as normative: supra note 33.
61. See Thomas McMorrow, "Learning to Mediate through Teaching Mediation," supra note 2.
62. Kennedy, "Legal Education," supra note 11 at 595-596.
63. Robert Frost in the film by WGBH Educational Foundation and Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc,
A Lover's Quarrel with the World (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc, 1969) cited in David A
Sohn & Richard H Tyre, Frost: the Poet and His Poetry (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc,
1969) at 107.
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"giving anything form gives you a confidence in the universe," he is
underscoring how a sense of objective order and a sense of subjective
meaning are mutually reinforcing. To have, in Frost's terms, "a confidence
in the universe" is to have a sense that there is an order to existence-an
order to which one is subject, and of which one is part. Creative activity,
what Frost calls "giving form," may be experienced not just as a way of
confirming, but of actually calling forth this sense of order.
It is not a matter, then, of either total rejection or complete embrace
of the way things happen to appear; ours is a creative, not purely reactive
role. Education should neither produce resignation nor indifference to the
always imperfect orders human beings construct in the world. Rather it
should help one to cultivate the disposition of "conflicted engagement"
Frost describes in one of his poems:
I hold your doctrine of Memento Mori.
And were an epitaph to be my story,
I'd have a short one ready for my own.
I would have written of me on my stone:
I had a lover's quarrel with the world.64
A human being who lacks a sense of meaning does not feel like his or
her choices matter. And so, judgments of faimess-as well as feelings of
obligation to act on them and confidence that one can-become irrelevant.
A sense of meaning and a sense of order are interlaced. Through the
construction of order, human beings come to identify as a collective, as
opposed to "an accidental accumulation of several individuals in one
spot."6 5 At the same time, only by identifying with others is it possible to
forge personal identities.66 Some degree of predictability is necessary for
human beings to pursue their projects. Order furnishes the conditions for
acting meaningfully. Absent a sense of order, one's actions seem to have
less salience because there is no counting on the what or the how, and no
accounting for the why.
The struggle for meaning and order in one's life is not unique to
participants in the DADS program. It is part of the human condition. The
more one learns about law and the legal system, the less confidence one
may feel about the level of recourse available to anyone who experiences
injustice. Moreover, the more one studies law, the more unstable social life
64. Robert Frost, "The Lesson for Today" quoted in Louis Entermeyer, ed, New Enlarged Pocket
Anthology ofRobert Frosts Poems (New York: Washington Square Press, 1973).
65. Karl N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush [1930] (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 116.
66. Charles Taylor, The Ethics ofAuthenticity (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press,
1991) at 40-41.
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may seem. Rather than becoming resigned to injustice or indifferent to it,
students of law, like participants in DADS, may discover what it means to
feel at once conflicted and engaged-both implicated in and responsible
for the order and disorder in one's own family and within society at large.
Such an opportunity is not the exclusive feature of "legal" education,
nor a characteristic exclusive to it. Neither institutionalized education in
general, nor formal legal education in particular, boast a monopoly over
this endeavor. And there's no guarantee that professors or students will
choose to take it up. Still, to view it as a foundational dimension of legal
education is to see that the value of legal education is not reducible to
what one learns about law. Its true worth lies in the opportunities it offers
for personal growth and renewed social engagement. Fostering these
activities-in law faculties and at support group sessions, in community
programs and at kitchen tables-more closely approximates "[n]ot ideas
of the thing but the thing itself."6 7
67. Wallace Stevens, "Not ideas of the thing but the thing itself' in The Collected Poems of Wallace
Stevens (New York: Vintage Books, 1982) at 534.

